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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The financial crisis has brought into relief the extraordinary risks created 
by the opaque over-the-counter (OTC)1 derivatives markets.2  Valued at over 
$600 trillion dollars, this market has traditionally allowed sophisticated 
financial players to trade various kinds of swaps bilaterally with one 
another.3  It is now widely accepted that OTC securities like credit default 
swaps (CDS) contributed to the exuberant credit markets seen pre-crisis, and 
brought about a deep misunderstanding of the risks permeating the financial 
system.4 In the aftermath of the crisis, policymakers around the world have 
                                                                                                                   
 1 As discussed below, over-the-counter markets refers to markets where trading takes place 
outside of regulated exchanges, allowing parties to transact bilaterally with one another 
without the usual transparency and risk management mechanisms that exchanges provide.  
Parties can also structure their transactions privately and according to their own specific risk 
preferences.  This can lead to greater risk-taking, and parties fail to provision for the risks that 
they assume.  See Bushan K. Jomadar, The ISDA Master Agreement – The Rise and Fall of a 
Major Financial Instrument (Working Paper, Aug. 24, 2007), available at  http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1326520 (analyzing the OTC market and the contractual 
framework governing transactions); Frank Partnoy, ISDA, NASD, CFMA, and SDNY: The 
Four Horsemen of Derivatives Regulation? (U. of San Diego School of Law, Pub. Law & 
Legal Theory Working Paper No. 39, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstractid=293085 (discussing the development of so-called “master agreements” in the 
OTC markets to help reduce the costs of private negotiation and the advantages and problems 
these pose in the OTC market). See, e.g., Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of 
Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387 (2013) (detailed analysis on the risks 
to clearinghouses of clearing CDS).    
 2 See, e.g., COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A PLAN 
FOR REGULATORY REFORM (2009), http://capmktsreg.org/app/uploads/2014/08/TGFC-CCMR 
_Executive_Summary_5-26-09.pdf.  For an early discussion of the phenomenon, see Lynn A. 
Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC 
Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701 (1999); Lynn A. Stout, The Legal Origin of the 2008 Financial 
Crisis (Feb. 25, 2011) (unpublished research paper No. 11-05, UCLA School of Law, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1770082; UBS, SHAREHOLDER 
REPORT ON UBS’S WRITE-DOWNS 12–14, available at http://www.ubs.com/1/ShowMedia/invest 
ors/agm?contentId=140333name=080418ShareholderReport.pdf. 
 3 For a pre-crisis and post-crisis statistical comparison, see BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
SEMIANNUAL OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS AT END-DECEMBER (2009), http://www.bis.org/statist 
ics/derstats.htm; see also ATLANTIC COUNCIL, THE DANGER OF DIVERGENCE: TRANSATLANTIC 
FINANCIAL REFORM AND THE G20 AGENDA 29–30, http://www.atlanticouncil.org/images/publicatio 
ns/Danger_of_Divergence_Transatlantic_Financial_Reform_1-22.pdf.  For more recent statistics, 
see BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, SEMIANNUAL OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS AT END-DECEMBER 
2011 (2012).  The figures quoted are measured in “notional” value.  This means, in general, the 
gross value of the obligations, rather than those that have been offset against one another.   
 4 See, e.g., Stout, supra note 2; see also Margaret Blair, Financial Innovation, Leverage, 
Bubbles and the Distribution of Income, 30 REV. BANK. & FIN. L. 225 (2010).  But see Rene 
M. Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 73 (2010) (arguing 
that CDS did not play a major role in causing the crisis).  For an excellent overview of the key 
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converged on a solution to the risks created by OTC derivatives—the 
clearinghouse.5  Rather than allowing financial firms to privately manage the 
dangers of trading derivatives, policymakers are looking instead to the 
clearinghouse to protect markets against the spread of risk.6  The 
clearinghouse is designed to act as a strong protective buffer against risk by 
becoming a central contract party for all trades, well placed to manage risks 
for the market by virtue of this position.7  As an institution specifically 
designed to monitor risks and provision for them as they arise, policymakers 
appear confident that the clearinghouse can stamp out any dangers and 
prevent a repeat of the 2008 debacle.  
This Article provides a short analysis of the role of the clearinghouse 
post-Crisis.  Without question, the clearinghouse now occupies an essential 
role as a risk-manager in international derivatives markets.  Despite this 
centrality, however, the literature has underplayed the broader significance of 
this development.  This Article argues that, in assuming its new 
responsibilities, the clearinghouse is increasingly looking like a new kind of 
regulator for the derivatives market.  This elevation of the clearinghouse 
from private institution to a provider of an essential public service is far from 
a straight-forward proposition.  The clearinghouse is not a risk-free 
institution, as policymakers have conventionally assumed.  Rather, in sharing 
the risks of complex derivative contracts, the clearinghouse itself can come 
to represent a source of enormous danger to markets.  But, as the frontline 
overseer of derivatives markets, the clearinghouse and other regulators can 
easily miss risks accumulating in the clearinghouse or underplay their 
significance until it is too late.  For an institution that may be the too-big-to-
fail firm in the market, the consequences of such a failure are likely to be 
catastrophic and costly for the financial system—not to mention taxpayers—
as a whole. 
                                                                                                                   
attributes of CDS and their risks and advantages see, Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The 
Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019 (2007).     
 5 THE G-20 PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, LEADER’S STATEMENT 9 (2009), http://ec.europa.eu/com 
mission_2010-2014/president/pdf/statement_20090826_en_2.pdf.  
 6 Numerous scholars have expressed skepticism regarding this solution.  See infra note 35.  
 7 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 799 (West 
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf.  As described 
later in this Article, the clearinghouse becomes a central counterparty to trades in the market.  
This means that the clearinghouse enters into the middle of the trade between a buyer and 
seller of securities.  It becomes the contract party to each side of the trade, becoming the seller 
to each buyer and the buyer to each seller.  In this way, traders only ever transact with a 
clearinghouse rather than assume risks on one another.  For discussion see discussion infra 
Part III.A. 
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Clearinghouses are not new to the market.  Rather, they are deeply 
embedded into its architecture and have functioned behind-the-scenes 
throughout its recent history to process trades and ensure they settle and 
complete.  Clearinghouses like the Depository Trust and Clearing 
Corporation (DTCC) have become indispensable to modern finance.  The 
DTCC, for example, functions as the clearinghouse to fifty exchanges and 
exchange-type platforms in the U.S., and processes around $1.6 quadrillion 
in trades annually.8  The clearinghouse for the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME)—a major exchange for trading derivatives like futures and options—
similarly processes around $1 quadrillion worth of trades annually.9  
Following the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, clearinghouses have begun 
to open their doors to clearing new products like the infamous CDS.  For 
example, through September 5, 2014, the Intercontinental Clear Credit, part 
of the Atlanta-based Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) Group that owns the 
New York Stock Exchange, reported clearing CDS worth more than $53 
trillion since its establishment in 2009.10  This figure is probably just the 
beginning.  Most likely, it will grow over time as CDS start to migrate more 
toward clearinghouses and away from the OTC space.11  
Clearinghouses are designed to reduce a single, basic risk in the market: a 
party to trade reneging on its side of the bargain-by ensuring that the two 
parties perform.  The rationale underpinning the clearinghouse’s function is 
straightforward: when the risk of default is low, traders will not have to pay 
additional money to guard against the other party’s nonperformance.  
Without a clearinghouse, individual traders must invest resources into 
understanding their counterparties by procuring information on their 
counterparties’ solvency and their ongoing ability to perform in the trades. 
As a result, markets become inefficient when securities prices reflect large 
transactional costs rather than the real value of securities.12  
                                                                                                                   
 8 Securing Today – Shaping Tomorrow, Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, 3–4 
(2013), http://www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/About/DTCC_Capabilities.ashx.   
 9 Clearing, CME GROUP, http://www.cmegroup.com/clearing/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).   
 10 ICE Clear Credit, ICE (Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.theice.com/clear-credit (measuring 
gross notional value of CDS, excluding set-offs, where exposures between two parties would 
be offsetting).  
 11 THE BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’R, THE CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP MARKET 
REPORT 1 (June 2012), available at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD3 
85.pdf (showing increasing volumes of CDS trading and factors like standardization and better 
information flows that may contribute to increasing volumes of trades).   
 12 Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce 
Counterparty Risk?, 1 REV. ASSET PRICING STUD. 74, 74–75 (2011) (noting the demand for 
clearinghouse functions in the wake of the collapse of Bear Stearns).    
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However, the simplicity of this goal belies the complex machinations that 
clearinghouses must perform to fulfill it.  For one, they must combine the 
resources of the largest financial institutions, who become members of the 
clearinghouse and provide capital to finance clearinghouse operations.  To 
reduce their risks, clearinghouses must: (i) ensure that they match trades 
correctly; (ii) agree on the standard terms and conditions on which they will 
clear and settle securities; (iii) maintain capital to support the ongoing risk of 
trading; (iv) gather information on counterparties; and (v) establish 
procedures in case counterparties default and trades fail to settle.13  To make 
this investment worthwhile, clearinghouses charge fees as well as offer a 
range of other side services to traders.14   
Certainly, clearinghouses can bring great gains to the OTC derivatives 
market.  Counterparty risks should diminish and OTC derivatives trades 
should become less complex.  Traders will be asked to provision 
systematically for the risks they assume and, if they fail, clearinghouses will 
absorb the costs of the fallout and prevent further contagion.     
However, clearinghouses are also assuming a central role in overseeing 
the derivatives market and in “regulating” the behavior and bargains of 
traders.  In setting the terms of contracts, capital and reporting requirements, 
and procedures for how failing firms are wound down, clearinghouses 
assume a key position of authority and control over the market.  Given the 
risky history of OTC derivatives and the challenges in understanding their 
complexity and costs, regulators are placing considerable trust in 
clearinghouses to meet their mandates successfully.    
On the one hand, this institutional delegation of labor to the clearinghouse 
shows considerable promise.  Clearinghouses have a direct line of sight over 
the market as a whole and considerable historical expertise in risk 
management.  On the other hand, there are reasons for caution.  Importantly, 
today’s leading clearinghouses are private, for-profit institutions, comprised 
of the largest financial firms—the kind that constitutes key players in OTC 
                                                                                                                   
 13 Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Clearing in Derivatives Markets Netting, Asymmetric 
Information, and the Sharing of Default Risks Through a Central Counterparty, 14–20 
(Working Paper, Jan. 8, 2009), available at http://www.bauer.uh.edu/spirrong/clearing_disclo 
sure.pdf; see, e.g., CME Clearing: Principles for Financial Markets Infrastructure Disclosure, 
CME GROUP 5–8 (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.cmegroup.com/clearing/risk-management/files/ 
cme-clearing-principles-for-financial-market-infrastructures-disclosure.pdf.    
 14 See, e.g., Clearing Services, DTCC, http://www.dtcc.com/clearing-services.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 14, 2014) (showing the variety of services provided by the clearinghouse in a 
variety of different types of security).   
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derivatives.15  Arguably, this dual role for the clearinghouse—as both 
overseer and market participant—is problematic for a number of reasons.  
For one, clearinghouses must balance the trade-off between generating high 
fees for their institution—by clearing high volumes of trades and providing a 
range of related services for fees—and investing in costly risk 
management.16  If clearinghouses make overly strict demands of their 
members and counterparties or charge high fees for their services, traders 
might take their business elsewhere.17  Additionally, the high reliance placed 
on clearinghouses to manage market risk by regulators—and their increasing 
indispensability for risk management—creates the risk that clearinghouses 
might face a lower intensity of regulatory scrutiny.  With their considerable 
power and influence within the structure of derivatives markets, 
clearinghouses garner influence on how to implement the G-20 clearing 
mandate.18  
This conference reflects on the complex relationship between 
corporations and the state.19  As other contributions to this symposium show, 
today’s multinational corporations are repositories of tremendous technical 
expertise and know-how.  With such attributes comes influence, particularly 
the ability to shape the content of rules and regulations and their 
implementation in the real world.  The clearinghouse offers an example of 
just such an institution, and regulators must analyze both its risks and 
rewards to repair damaged financial markets.  
This Article is structured as follows: Part II provides an overview of the 
clearinghouse and a brief introduction to OTC derivatives markets; Part III 
discusses the benefits of clearinghouses and the risks of their central 
derivatives operation; Part IV briefly discusses some implications.     
                                                                                                                   
 15 Sean J. Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure for 
Derivatives Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY L.J. 1153, 1218–20 (2012).   
 16 Yadav, supra note 1, at 416–17, 432–33 (illustrating the problematic incentives that 
encourage clearinghouse members to take risks at the expense of the clearinghouse).  See also 
Pirrong, supra note 13.  
 17 Yadav, supra note 1.   
 18 See infra note 63.  
 19 Conference, The New Roles of Corporations in Global Governance, University of 
Georgia School of Law, Athens, Georgia, April 18, 2014. 
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II.  BACKGROUND ON THE ROLE OF CLEARINGHOUSES  
A.  Key Functions  
Clearinghouses have deep roots in today’s securities markets.  They 
developed in the 1880s to support the then-burgeoning securities 
exchanges.20  As traders began to come together to trade stocks, bonds and 
commodity derivatives, they faced a problem: could they trust one another to 
keep to the terms of their bargain?21  The agreement between two traders to 
buy and sell stocks to one another did not mean that they would actually 
follow through with the trade.  In the time it might take for the seller to 
complete the paperwork, she could find another buyer for her securities.  
Similarly, a buyer could find another seller willing to sell the shares more 
cheaply.  Worse, in the time it took to complete the trade, one of the traders 
could go bust, leaving her assets to be resolved through the bankruptcy 
process.  Where a buyer defaulted on her obligations, the failure to complete 
a trade could set off a chain reaction of failures.  For example, a seller may 
have ended up with insufficient money to make good on another contract.  
These uncertainties impose costs.  Where parties cannot rely on the certainty 
of their bargain, they can choose either to not proceed with the deal or to 
discount the price of securities to reflect the likelihood of the counterparty’s 
default.22  Additionally, in deciding whether to trade or not trade, and on 
what terms, traders must invest in gathering information on the other party 
and putting terms and conditions in place to incentivize performance.  Seen 
from the welfare perspective, the aggregate economic costs of this default 
risk can be enormous due to mispriced capital, failed deals, and high 
transaction costs.   
Clearinghouses have arisen as a response by private firms to overcome 
this problem of counterparty risk.23  Clearinghouses fulfill a number of key 
                                                                                                                   
 20 Franklin R. Edwards, The Clearing Association in Futures Markets: Guarantor and 
Regulator, in THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION OF FUTURES MARKETS 225 (Ronald W. 
Anderson ed., 1984); Craig Pirrong, If It’s So Great . . ., STREETWISE PROFESSOR (Nov. 22, 
2008, 5:03 PM), http://streetwiseprofessor.com/?p=984.   
 21 For a detailed account see Yadav, supra note 1, at 408.   
 22 Randall S. Kroszner, Can the Financial Markets Privately Regulate Risk? The 
Development of Derivatives Clearinghouses and Recent Over-the-Counter Innovations, 31 J. 
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 596, 598–604 (1999); James T. Moser, Contracting Innovations 
and the Evolution of Clearing and Settlement Methods at Futures Exchanges (Fed. Reserve 
Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. WP-98-26, 1998).  
 23 Yadav, supra note 1, at 391.  See also Pirrong, supra note 20 (arguing that the industry 
faced regulatory pressure to create clearinghouses).   
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market functions: (i) they aim to ensure that trades are settled, meaning that a 
buyer receives her shares and a seller receives her money; (ii) they seek to 
ensure that traders understand and pay for the risks that they assume; (iii) 
they collect information on trades and report it to markets and regulators; and 
(iv) they establish procedures to control the spread of risks in cases where a 
firm fails to complete trades, or otherwise collapses altogether.  
Broadly speaking, clearinghouses and exchanges work together to enable 
securities trading in today’s markets.  Exchanges bring buyers and sellers 
together to help them arrive at a bargain.  Through listing rules, exchanges 
control which securities are traded and which institutions are eligible to enter 
the marketplace.  Exchanges also provide continuous information on prices 
to encourage efficient trading.24  Once traders strike a bargain on the 
exchange, the trade moves forward and settles through the clearinghouse.  
When the clearinghouse takes over, it promises the buyer and seller that the 
trade will settle, reducing their uncertainty costs and the risks of failure that 
each side faces.  
The clearinghouse achieves these goals through two core innovations.  
First, the clearinghouse novates all contracts to itself.  Second, the 
clearinghouse mutualizes losses between members. 
Novation: Novation describes the major way through which 
clearinghouses reduce counterparty risks: the central counterparty becomes 
the contract party to the trades that they process.25  This means that 
clearinghouses break the contract between the buyer and seller and create 
two new contracts from this single bargain: (i) one contract between itself 
and the seller to purchase securities, and (ii) another contract between itself 
and the buyer to sell the securities.  This act of novation of contracts achieves 
a singular purpose.  Rather than take a risk on individual traders, buyers and 
sellers of securities instead take a risk on the clearinghouse.  In theory, this 
should be a much safer bet.26  This model is known as the central 
                                                                                                                   
 24 Henry Crosby Emery, Speculation on the Stock and Produce Exchanges of the United 
States, in 7 STUD. IN HIST., ECON. & PUB. L. 289 (1896); Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock 
Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2546–50 (2006) (discussing the key 
functions of exchanges); Jonathan R. Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: 
The Emergence of Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 
CORNELL L. REV. 1007 (1990) (discussing international competition for exchanges).   
 25 COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES 1 (2004).   
 26 For more detail, see JOHN MCPARTLAND, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHI., CLEARING AND 
SETTLEMENT DEMYSTIFIED 3 (2005), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/ 
publications/chicago_fed_letter/2005/cfljanuary2005_210.pdf; Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang 
Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk?, 1 REV. ASSET PRICES 
2014] CLEARINGHOUSES AND REGULATION BY PROXY  169 
 
counterparty model, or CCP, for a clearinghouse.27  Owing to its perceived 
utility in reducing trading risks, the CCP has come to be regarded as a gold 
standard for international markets, one that national regulators should aim to 
adopt where feasible.28 
Mutualization: Mutualization describes the capacity of clearinghouses to 
share losses between members.  When members come together to form a 
clearinghouse they undertake to cover the losses of other members where 
necessary.  In other words, clearinghouse members work to insure one 
another.  Where one member collapses, leaving open trades still requiring 
completion, mutualization ensures that the clearinghouse completes any open 
trades, even if these come at a cost to the clearinghouse and its remaining 
members.29 
B.  Clearinghouses as Risk Managers  
Clearinghouses take on direct risks in the securities markets.  By 
becoming a contract party to trades, clearinghouses promise to complete 
trades even if this comes at a private cost to the clearinghouse.  This risk 
requires CCPs to take protective measures that safeguard the institution from 
excessive accumulations of danger.  Key measures include: (i) provisions for 
trades to be supported by security or collateral; (ii) a default fund to act as 
first-absorber for losses; and (iii) default measures that seek to wind down a 
member’s positions through set-off and netting.30  
Collateral: Clearinghouses require traders to provide collateral to the 
clearinghouses to reflect the ongoing risk of a trade.  Parties generally 
provide capital at the start of a trade and as the trade progresses, calibrating 
the amount of collateral to reflect the risk of the trade.  Collateral serves two 
basic purposes.  In the first case, it helps parties internalize the costs of their 
                                                                                                                   
STUD. 74, 74–75 & n.1 (2011) (noting that clearinghouses only reduce risks when there are 
sufficient members within the clearinghouse).    
 27 It should be noted that not all clearinghouses operate using a CCP, but may use another 
format, notably, a principal-to-principal model.  See Pirrong, supra note 13 (discussing the Tin 
Crisis and the organization of the London Metal Exchange).   
 28 See, e.g., COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS., supra note 25, at 1–3.   
 29 MCPARTLAND, supra note 26; Pirrong, supra note 13; Yadav, supra note 1.  For an 
excellent European perspective, see DERMOT TURING, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT IN EUROPE 
(2012).  
 30 See, e.g., CME Group, CME Rulebook, rr. 8H04(2)–(3), 8H10, available at http://www. 
cmegroup.com/rulebook/CME/I/8H/8H.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2014); LCH.Clearnet Group, 
General Regulations of LCH.CLEARNET Limited, Regs. 20, 45 (2014), available at http:// 
www.lchcl earnet.com/documents/731485/762691/General+Regulations.pdf/076a0e06-ddf3-4 
1db-99a2-90d5a8a2968a (reciting necessary coverage for collateral requirements).     
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risk-taking.  Second, capital also ensures that the clearinghouse has assets 
that it can liquidate to offset any losses that it faces in case of a default.  As a 
result, clearinghouses generally require that their counterparties provide 
sufficient collateral to support their trades.31 
A “default fund” comprises a pool of cash or high-quality assets that are 
provided by clearinghouse members to support its functions.  This default 
fund allows a clearinghouse to enjoy a first buffer to absorb losses before it 
must start calling on members to pay for the losses of others.  Clearinghouse 
rules generally require contributions to default funds as a condition of their 
participation.32 
Clearinghouses also stipulate clear “default processes” to account for and 
contain the default of a member.  These processes give clearinghouses the 
power to suspend the trading privileges of troubled members and to stipulate 
how such a removal is undertaken.33  Upon insolvency, clearinghouses 
immediately “net off” any open positions, converting gross exposures to net 
exposures between members.  Such netting can be very useful and 
potentially reduce the chances of risk spreading to other clearinghouse 
members.  
Ordinarily, if insolvency takes place outside of a clearinghouse, creditor 
claims can become stuck in a lengthy and uncertain bankruptcy process.  A 
creditor must present its claim alongside those of other creditors and wait to 
be paid out of any available assets in the debtor’s estate.  However, if a 
member becomes insolvent with central clearing in place, the situation is 
quite different.  If insolvent bank A is owed money from bank B, but bank A 
itself owes money to banks C and D, its claims against bank B are used to 
pay off its claims to banks C and D.  Banks C and D do not wait in line with 
bank A’s various other creditors.  Rather, they are repaid immediately.  Take 
a simple example, when bank A becomes insolvent, it expects to receive 
$100 from bank B.  However, bank A also owes bank C $25 and bank D $50 
for outstanding contracts that are centrally cleared.  In this simple case, bank 
B pays the clearinghouse the $100 that are owed to bank A.  The 
clearinghouse then has this money to repay banks C and D $25 and $50 
respectively.  
Multilateral netting can be very helpful to reducing the spread of risk 
through the clearinghouse and the financial system.  Bank C and bank D do 
not have to stand in line to wait for creditor claims to be resolved in a 
                                                                                                                   
 31 See, e.g., ICE CLEAR CREDIT, Clearing Rules, available at https://www.theice.com/publi 
cdocs/clear_credit/ICE_Clear_Credit_Rules.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).   
 32 See, e.g., id. at 88 (discussing required contributions into the default fund).  
 33 See, e.g., id. at 20 (explaining suspension of trading privileges upon default). 
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bankruptcy process.  They are immediately paid through the clearinghouse.  
In theory, then, after being repaid quickly on their claims, bank C and bank 
D should have a chance of surviving the insolvency of bank A.  For the 
clearinghouse, multilateral netting can help stave off the spread of risk from 
one bank to another and prevent the default of one bank causing cash 
shortages and defaults for others.  Where the number of member defaults can 
be contained and controlled, clearinghouses shield themselves from 
excessive losses and the financial system from contagion.34  Default 
processes help build greater resilience into the system.  By providing rules 
for default processes, the clearinghouse can better absorb the shock and 
prevent its worst effects from cascading through the market as a whole.35 
In general, the clearinghouse has enjoyed a strong record as a risk 
manager in the market. For example, clearinghouses appeared to have 
weathered the 2008 financial crisis with considerable confidence.  In 
handling the fallout from the collapse of Lehman Brothers, LCH.Clearnet, 
the London-based clearinghouse, reported that it had closed out almost nine 
trillion dollars in interest rate swaps exposures without having to dip into its 
default fund.36  Mutualization was unnecessary in that instance.  However, 
while rare, clearinghouses have come under stress from time to time.  A 
notable example was the aftermath of Black Friday in 1987, when the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average crashed unexpectedly, resulting in the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange and the Options Clearing Corporation teetering on the 
verge of collapse.  In that case, the Federal Reserve provided emergency 
liquidity to banks with a view of coaxing these banks to provide bridge 
liquidity to the two clearinghouses.37  More recently, in March 2014, a South 
Korean broker trading in Seoul—HanMag Securities—entered into a number 
                                                                                                                   
 34 See Richard Squire, Clearinghouses as Liquidity Partitioning, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 
863–67 (2014).  For an excellent analysis of multilateral netting and the shock absorbance of 
the clearinghouse see also Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 
1641, 1661–62 (2013) (explaining how clearinghouses can prevent runs on the derivatives 
market).      
 35 But see Mark Roe, Clearinghouse Over-confidence, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Oct. 26, 2011), 
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of erroneous trades and ended up taking on more liabilities than the value of 
its assets.  A computer error caused the broker to enter into a number of 
unwanted trades. In this case, default procedures were triggered by the 
clearinghouse and members were asked to contribute to ensure that the 
clearinghouse made good on its trades.38 
In other words, clearinghouse risk mitigation processes have worked well 
most of the time.  However, the risks are ever-present, as demonstrated by 
the potential for catastrophic collapses to occur in cases of extreme and 
unexpected events like the 1987 Black Friday Crash where losses are hard to 
predict and difficult to provision for ex ante. 
C.  Clearinghouse Ownership  
Historically, clearinghouses have been owned and run by their members 
for their members.39  This reflects the history of clearinghouses as an 
industry initiative to control risks and the costs of trading.  However, 
clearinghouses are also for-profit institutions and provide valuable services 
to the market.40  As clearinghouses grow to provide services for the $600 
trillion derivatives market, they are becoming major sources of revenue.  
Indeed, the paradigmatic structure of clearinghouse ownership has 
undergone a fundamental change and moved towards a more “corporate” 
model.41  Clearinghouses have increasingly come to be owned by large 
international exchange groups that include multiple exchanges and 
clearinghouses within their structure.  The CME Group, for example, owns 
and operates several derivatives exchanges, including the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange, the Chicago Board of Trade, and the New York Metal 
Exchange (NYMEX) amongst others.  These group-member exchanges clear 
their trades through CME Clearing. More recently, the CME Group began 
operating a derivatives exchange in Europe, CME Clearing Europe, to 
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accommodate the demand for clearing in OTC markets.42  Importantly, it 
should be noted that CME’s stock is publically traded and is listed on 
NASDAQ.43  The ICE Group, similarly, reflects an expansive, international 
structure comprising of numerous exchanges and clearinghouses.  ICE, 
which began life as a dedicated exchange for energy markets, has grown 
rapidly, culminating in its acquisition of the New York Stock Exchange.  The 
ICE Network includes eleven exchanges and five clearinghouses 
worldwide.44  As with the CME Group, ICE’s shares are listed and traded on 
NASDAQ.45 
The evolving ownership structure of exchanges and clearinghouses is 
noteworthy.  As commentators have noted, clearinghouses and exchanges 
can face conflicts of interest between their duty to shareholders and their role 
as providers of risk management services.46  Exchanges and clearinghouses 
generate revenue by attracting traders to their platforms and by developing 
active markets that can foster efficiencies for those that use the market.47  
Revenues also help generate returns for shareholders.  However, risk 
management can increase costs for traders and market participants to use 
exchange and clearinghouse services.  This can happen through collateral 
requirements, high eligibility conditions as well as mandatory contributions 
to default funds for market participants.  In such cases, clearinghouses and 
exchanges must contend with a basic trade-off: they balance lower 
participation costs for traders, potentially placing their own institutions at 
higher risks, or they can impose more stringent conditions for the use of 
exchange and clearinghouse services to protect their institutions, but at a cost 
to business and revenue from traders.  Certainly, this problem can also exist 
for member-owned and managed institutions.  In such cases, member-users 
have incentives to keep compliance costs low for themselves.48  However, 
the larger point remains.  The status of clearinghouses as private, for-profit 
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providers of a public good can be a source of risk in its own right.  Owners 
may underestimate long-term risks, favoring near-term gains in revenue and 
reputation over improbable but extreme risk events.    
D.  Clearinghouses after the Crisis  
Given their long history in maintaining the orderly functioning of 
securities markets, it is unsurprising that policymakers are looking to 
clearinghouses as a key means of controlling risks post-Crisis.  Around the 
globe, commentators and lawmakers agree that derivatives trading on OTC 
markets must move to regulated and well-lit exchanges and that trades 
should be settled using clearinghouses.49  In light of this mandate, national 
regulators have moved forward with implementing rules that require OTC 
derivative instruments to migrate to exchanges for trading, and to 
clearinghouses for central clearing.50  
The rationale underpinning this consensus is easy to understand.  First, 
clearinghouses—as CCPs—will guarantee that trades settle, maintaining the 
bargain even if one of the parties to that transaction defaults.  With a CCP in 
place, financial markets should not see a repeat of the failure of the 
American International Group—the insurer that failed in September 2008 
having taken on excessive risks in the CDS market.51  Reducing counterparty 
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risks should better contain systemic contagion in the marketplace.  Second, 
clearinghouses can help to encourage better reporting of trades and 
information flows in the market.  Under new regulations, clearinghouses and 
exchanges must collect information and report this data to regulators.52  With 
lower information costs, market participants can better understand the risks 
they assume, and thus how to price those risks.  Third, rather than leave 
individual traders to decide amongst each other how much capital to keep for 
each trade, clearinghouses can harness their past experience to fulfill this 
task more systematically.  With better collateral, complex derivatives trading 
can be undertaken on a sounder footing, limiting their potential to trigger 
systemic risks.  Fourth, exchanges and clearinghouses should standardize 
derivatives contracts, allowing them to be traded more easily.  With greater 
standardization, risks may be simpler and easier to understand.  Finally, 
clearinghouses and exchanges—with vast international networks—can 
monitor global derivatives markets.  Such cross-border operations can 
overcome the challenges faced by national regulators seeking to monitor 
transactions beyond their own jurisdictions. 
III.  THE NEW REGULATORY LANDSCAPE  
A.  Clearinghouses as Regulators  
Clearinghouses find themselves in a unique position in post-Dodd-Frank 
derivatives markets.  They are at once central to the operation of these 
markets and, at the same time, a key part of the transactional dynamics of the 
marketplace.  In other words, clearinghouses are responsible for assuring the 
safety and soundness of derivatives trades, while acting as counterparties to 
OTC derivatives trading.  This presents a puzzle for regulators.  
Policymakers increasingly rely on clearinghouses to monitor markets and to 
ensure they remain risk-free, while, at the same time, clearinghouses are also 
an interested party in the trades they oversee.  
Arguably, the extensive role that clearinghouses play in post-Dodd Frank 
derivative markets suggests that they are taking a leading role in monitoring 
markets.  Not only are they regulating the behavior of market participants, 
but they are also forging the design of new derivatives markets.  With these 
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responsibilities, it is at least debatable that clearinghouses are exercising 
significant regulatory power in today’s derivative markets.53 
Broadly speaking, post-Dodd Frank clearinghouses have considerable 
authority to: (i) make rules regarding how OTC derivatives should trade; (ii) 
oversee the implementation of these rules; and; (iii) determine who can 
participate in today’s derivatives markets and at what cost through their 
eligibility standards.  
Rulemaking: As discussed, clearinghouses set rules for their members 
with respect to derivatives trading.  If members do not comply with these 
rules, they are unlikely to be able to utilize the services of the clearinghouse.  
These rules include key stipulations for the transaction itself, including 
contract requirements, capital provisioning, reporting rules as well as 
mandatory procedures for terminating a trader’s positions and netting out any 
outstanding obligations upon default.  As CCP, the clearinghouse can 
monitor compliance with these stipulations as a contract party to trades.  
Where parties fail to comply, for example, where they are unable to provide 
capital, or where they fail to report trades in a timely fashion, they can face 
sanctions from the clearinghouse.54  These sanctions might result in higher 
costs of participation for a trader, more limited rights to use the 
clearinghouse’s services, and as a last resort, an outright bar.  This regulatory 
power also implies the power to shape the market.  Where the clearinghouse 
makes decisions as to who can use its services, it also takes a position on 
who cannot do so. 
This regulatory power matters.  In the first instance, the determinations 
and decisions that clearinghouses make hold considerable economic 
significance for market participants.  For example, rules as to capital impact 
the costs attaching to trades.  Reporting rules require traders to disclose 
sensitive trading data, and clearinghouse stipulations as to what kinds of 
contracts traders can use affect the structures of trades and the types of deals 
that market participants can undertake.  Importantly, from the public policy 
perspective, clearinghouse determinations have real significance for 
maintaining order in public markets.  Where these determinations are based 
on faulty assumptions—for example, if capital calculations are made using 
incomplete data and bad models—the public purse is potentially at risk.55  
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Moreover, where clearinghouses operate on a cross-border basis and where 
their stipulations reach multiple jurisdictions, this influence can be expansive 
and extend across many markets. 
B.  The Benefits of Clearinghouse Control  
The exercise of rule-making and supervisory authority by clearinghouses 
can bring numerous benefits for derivatives markets.  Most importantly, as 
discussed earlier, clearinghouses have long been deployed in securities 
markets.56  As a result, clearinghouses bring an obvious advantage of age and 
experience to the task of risk management.  On account of their ever-present 
role in securities markets, clearinghouses have had to invest in understanding 
markets, developing infrastructure, modeling techniques and risk 
management skills to be able to act as CCP in equities, bonds, and in certain 
exchange-traded derivative markets.  This might suggest that clearinghouses 
are well-positioned to harness past experience to oversee OTC derivatives 
markets. 
Indeed, clearinghouses arguably have powerful incentives to invest 
resources in developing in-depth expertise to discharge their risk 
management and oversight responsibilities post-Dodd-Frank.  For one, as 
CCPs, clearinghouses are on the hook to ensure that trades settle safely.  
They face direct economic consequences should they fail to invest resources 
in fully understanding OTC derivatives markets.  The fact that this market is 
notoriously complex, as shown by the 2008 Financial Crisis, and where risks 
are often difficult to understand, should spur investment in developing high-
quality risk management systems.  After all, if clearinghouses fail to make 
the proper judgments about the risks that they assume, their members may be 
in line to face extensive, unquantifiable losses.  And where member firms 
cannot predict their likely liabilities with a reasonable degree of certainty ex 
ante, there is a chance that they may not agree to participate in the 
clearinghouse at all.  
But, in addition to the economic liability risks that clearinghouses face, 
they are also under scrutiny from the reputational perspective.  
Clearinghouses are under the spotlight like never before—an institution 
generally likened to a provider of the market’s “plumbing” has in recent 
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years emerged into the public domain.57  In this context, clearinghouses face 
reputational pressures where they are unable to perform to successfully 
discharge their obligations under the Dodd-Frank Act.  These pressures 
should, in theory at least, result in motivation to understand the risks of OTC 
markets and to ensure that the clearinghouse is institutionally equipped to 
deal with the complexities inherent in managing them. 
The key question, however, is whether private clearinghouses are in the 
best position to take on the job of overseeing the risks and monitoring of 
derivatives markets—or whether another institution may be better suited to 
the task.  For example, might a public CCP work more optimally to give 
regulators direct insights into the derivative markets in real time?  This 
question is, of course, a difficult one and one that merits a nuanced and 
detailed response.  However, from the perspective of private clearinghouses, 
there exist some arguments for the status quo.  For a start, industry insiders—
like those that comprise the membership of the clearinghouse—may be better 
placed to understand market innovations and the pace of their evolution.  
Also, those within the industry may be more familiar with new financial 
products, how they work, and the risks associated with them.  Additionally, 
the for-profit model may work to encourage investment in understanding 
industry innovations and emerging risks.  To attract business, private 
clearinghouses may be motivated to develop risk management practices that 
match and adapt to new products and markets.  Finally, from a normative 
perspective, there exists an argument for market participants to internalize 
the costs of their own risk-taking.  Put another way, private clearinghouses 
ought to invest their own resources in risk management to the fullest extent 
in order to meet industry demands for their services.  If a public CCP 
becomes the main risk manager, the operation of the derivatives market ends 
up subsidized to a considerable extent by the public purse.  Where the 
hypothetical public CCP enjoys access to unlimited taxpayer funds for its 
operation, there is also a chance it may not use this capital optimally.  A 
private clearinghouse, by contrast, is likely to be accountable to its members, 
users and the shareholders that ultimately own the clearinghouse and related 
exchanges.  
That the clearinghouse is gaining a position of high authority in 
derivatives markets may thus be a benefit for markets and regulators.  
Historical expertise and resources to invest in research, combined with the 
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normative goal of encouraging the industry to pay for its own risk-taking 
arguably reinforce the post-Dodd-Frank consensus that clearinghouses play a 
central role in risk management.  
C.  The Risks of Clearinghouse Control  
Still, there are reasons for caution.  First, as discussed earlier, 
clearinghouses and exchanges are for-profit institutions that are driven to 
attract revenues and users to their platforms.  Unsurprisingly, the Dodd-
Frank Act came as welcome news for clearinghouses—representing an 
enormous opportunity for expansion and growth into the formerly closed 
OTC markets.58  This proximity between clearinghouses and the traders they 
are required to monitor, represents a source of risk for markets.  
For one, clearinghouses may fail to properly charge their users for the 
risks they take on through the clearinghouse.  It can benefit clearinghouses to 
impose lower compliance costs in order to attract business to their platforms.  
Viewed another way, there are at least disincentives against charging high 
costs for participation—such as those that represent a strict emphasis on 
safety and soundness, or an attempt by the clearinghouse to over-insure itself 
against the likelihood of default.  Where participation charges are high, 
traders have incentives to stay outside of the clearinghouse, or to find ways 
in which to structure their trades that—while economically similar to a 
regulated trade—may be cleared at lower cost under an alternative regime.  
The creativity of market participants, in this regard, is far from a theoretical 
possibility.  Commentators, for example, have noted an increased tendency 
for traders to structure their swaps contracts as futures.  While swaps are 
subject to extensive regulation and reporting treatment under the Dodd-Frank 
Act, futures—that have long traded on exchanges and cleared centrally—can 
potentially be traded at lower cost.59  Put simply, the dependence of 
clearinghouses on revenue from their users may lead to less-than-optimal 
monitoring and are rule-making by clearinghouses.  
Certainly, clearinghouses have incentives to police risk diligently.  This 
helps save the clearinghouse and its members from harm—both economic 
and reputational.  But, there are also competing incentives that may push in 
favor of less stringent regulation of traders.  In particular, clearinghouses and 
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users can benefit from a system of lower compliance costs in the short-term.  
In this way, the clearinghouse earns revenue, while users are able to trade 
derivatives at lower cost.  Additionally, the ultimate risks that a member 
defaults—particularly in a market where players are known to one another—
are fairly remote.  With risks unlikely to materialize in the short-term, there 
may be incentives to regulate more lightly.  Importantly, if risks do 
materialize and if members start to look shaky, there may be a good chance 
that the clearinghouse itself will go into distress.  If the clearinghouse has 
insufficiently provisioned for risks, and if these risks materialize, its chances 
of raising money in such an environment and surviving a crisis may be slim.  
Where the clearinghouse also falls into distress in the long-term, then short-
term incentives may be driven towards making gains.  When it fails, the 
clearinghouse’s shareholders or members will be either wiped out or bailed 
out, but, in the meantime, they can make gains through the functions of the 
clearinghouse.60  
The risks may be augmented where regulators place too heavy a reliance 
on the clearinghouse to fulfill its mandate successfully and fail to exercise 
effective oversight.  Given the obvious advantages that clearinghouses 
possess—experience, expertise, resources, and proximity to industry—
regulators may end up becoming too reliant on clearinghouses, and they may 
not invest fully in policing the market.  This is a separate issue from that of 
regulatory capture.  Rather, where clearinghouses assume the lion’s share of 
everyday policing and monitoring of derivatives markets, there may be little 
benefit to regulators expanding public money to develop technology and 
expertise to match or exceeds industry efforts.  Regulators relying on 
industry gatekeepers to fulfill key regulatory functions—sometimes with 
costly results—is not new to markets.  Most recently, the high reliance 
placed by regulators and the industry on credit rating agencies, underscored 
the risk of regulators failing to exercise full scrutiny, where the industry itself 
agrees to take on a prominent regulatory role.61  
Then, there is the ever-present issue of regulatory capture.  The public 
choice literature in this area is vast and well-known. In this context, it is 
arguable that the regulatory power of clearinghouses may stand as an 
impediment to their regulation.  On the one hand, the relatively small number 
of clearinghouses in the market makes them indispensable to traders as well 
as to regulators.  As has become clear throughout this discussion, 
                                                                                                                   
 60 Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
1151, 1182–91 (2010).  
 61 Yair Listokin & Benjamin Taibleson, If You Misrate, Then You Lose: Improving Credit 
Rating Accuracy Through Incentive Compensation, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 92–95 (2010).    
2014] CLEARINGHOUSES AND REGULATION BY PROXY  181 
 
clearinghouses perform a specialized role—one that is risky.  Only a small 
number of institutions are eligible to perform such a function.62  On the other 
hand, this stature can give clearinghouses considerable influence, not only in 
terms of impacting how regulation is crafted, but also how it is enforced.  In 
particular, regulators may end up facing disciplinary constraints when taking 
actions against clearinghouses.  Small in number and highly specialized in 
function, their position is likely to limit the kinds of actions that regulators 
can take in cases of misconduct, allowing clearinghouses—as key providers 
of a public good—some measure of regulatory deference.  In this context, 
clearinghouses may not end up fully internalizing the costs of their conduct 
in markets.  
The combination of proximity to those actors it regulates as well as the 
likelihood that regulators rely excessively on the clearinghouse post-Crisis 
presents a variety of risks for markets.  While these risks may be hard to 
gauge in the short-term—particularly where markets are buoyant—they may 
be powerful in their long-term impact.  
IV.  SOME CONCLUSIONS  
The centrality of clearinghouses in today’s markets merits a deeper 
understanding of their functions and influence on market design.  With an 
extensive portfolio of responsibilities, clearinghouses have emerged as 
essential to the success of the G-20 agenda.63  Their role in assuring that 
derivatives market function safely and without posing system-wide risks, is 
one that is as challenging as it is demanding.  This role requires 
clearinghouses to craft detailed rules on contract design, safety and 
soundness, and default.  The scope of these duties points to the conclusion 
that clearinghouses occupy a position of authority in derivatives markets, 
making rules for market participants as well as ensuring that these rules are 
followed.  These responsibilities—combined with the coercive authority to 
set conditions on which firms can access the clearinghouse’s infrastructure—
shows that clearinghouses possess a privileged position as a new kind of 
regulator for the market.   
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Certainly, there is much to commend clearinghouses for this role—most 
particularly, historical experience in providing CCP services for equity, bond 
and some derivative markets.  This experience should offer infrastructure, 
deep reservoirs of knowledge, and an understanding of market dynamics and 
industry players.  At the same time, there are also serious risks generated by 
the closeness of clearinghouses to those whom they oversee, and the 
underlying incentive to generate fees from these firms.  With an interest in 
promoting further business, clearinghouses face trade-offs between imposing 
costly compliance costs on traders and securing volume and fees for their 
business.  Importantly, the high reliance on clearinghouses can encourage 
regulators to take their eyes off the ball, and fail to invest in overseeing 
clearinghouses and the quality of oversight that clearinghouses provide.  
Needless to say, as the $600 trillion derivatives market shifts into 
clearinghouses, the consequences of regulatory failure on this matter would 
invariably be catastrophic.  
As a result, it seems clear that it is necessary to develop strategies to 
better control the risks that may be created by clearinghouses and the deep 
reliance on their oversight capabilities.  While a full analysis is outside of the 
scope of this Article, some avenues for future research are briefly set out 
below. 
Peer Review: Clearinghouses create risks for one another.  Where one 
clearinghouse fails to discharge its responsibilities, these risks can spiral and 
affect the operations of other clearinghouses in the market.  For example, if 
one member takes on too many risks and fails, its failure is likely to impact 
several clearinghouses—especially, if the firm is also a member of several 
clearinghouses in the market.  As a result, clearinghouses exhibit mutual 
dependencies that may be harnessed in the interest of better regulation.  In 
this context, peer review may be a useful tool.  Regulators may develop a 
framework for clearinghouses to engage in a form of peer review to 
systematically analyze each other’s risk management systems.  Competitive 
clearinghouses have an interest in ensuring that each other’s systems are 
effective and unlikely to cause spirals of risk.  This might also point to the 
utility of clearinghouses utilizing their own expertise to also monitor the 
functioning of their peer institutions.  Competitive incentives may work to 
motivate clearinghouses to install higher-quality systems where there is 
concern about peer review and worry about reputational damage.  
Of course, one might argue that peer review between private 
clearinghouses is unlikely to be particularly useful.  Clearinghouses have an 
interest in keeping costs low and business running. Also, where 
clearinghouses specialize in different types of product their expertise may be 
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less useful for improving the quality of other systems.  Still, while there are 
likely to be drawbacks to such a system—and concerns about the standards 
by which competitors monitor each other—it provides one option in the 
regulatory arsenal to better scrutinize clearinghouses and to ensure that 
clearinghouses internalize the costs of their behavior.  
International Regulatory Scrutiny: Clearinghouses are also international 
institutions.  Failures in one jurisdiction are likely to reverberate in others, 
not only because clearinghouses form part of large international 
conglomerates, but also because member firms often have operations in 
different countries.  This interdependence generates opportunities for 
developing coordination and cooperation mechanisms between international 
regulators.  In other words, international regulators can benefit from working 
more closely with one another to oversee clearinghouses.  This kind of 
scrutiny seeks to create a form of regulatory peer review between national 
regulators.  Regulators from one jurisdiction may bring expertise from their 
home states to exercise scrutiny over clearinghouses in other jurisdictions.  
One might also consider formulating committees of national regulators to 
take a role in assessing the operations of an international clearinghouse.  The 
goal of such oversight is straight-forward: where international regulators are 
likely to be impacted by clearinghouse failure, they have incentives to ensure 
its effective function.  By bringing regulators together to exercise scrutiny of 
clearinghouse risk management functions, there may be fewer vulnerabilities 
to regulatory capture—the risk that a regulator of a single jurisdiction 
becomes overly reliant on a clearinghouse for oversight and fails to invest in 
supervision.  
However, such cooperative mechanisms can have their own problems.  
For one, regulators from diverse jurisdictions can have varying preferences 
as to what constitutes optimal regulation.64  These divergences may reflect 
national preferences and past practice, rather than a “correct” or “best” 
model for scrutinizing a large and important financial institution.  In such 
cases, assessments may have limited utility and may end up exposing 
institutions to a hodge-podge of regulatory regimes and ideas.  Still, in the 
event of clearinghouse failure, regulators from major developed jurisdictions 
may well have to coordinate and provide emergency liquidity to a large 
clearinghouse.  If this happens, ensuring that regulators are closely 
monitoring clearinghouses ex ante can arguably facilitate buy-in from a 
                                                                                                                   
 64  Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99 GEO. 
L.J. 257, 273 (2011) (commenting on diverging perspectives of international regulators).   
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variety of national regulators and provide a holistic understanding of 
clearinghouse operations globally. 
Regulatory Dialogue: The essential role of the clearinghouse and the 
authority it implies suggests the necessity for regulators to engage in active 
dialogue with clearinghouses as derivatives move to be centrally cleared.  In 
particular, the new regulatory role of the clearinghouse highlights the 
importance of public authorities catching problems early.  By careful and 
regular monitoring, regulators can understand where risks are developing and 
ensure that contingencies are in place in case clearinghouses fall into 
distress.  This interaction between regulators and clearinghouses implies a 
kind of bargain between them with agreement as to the role that each side 
plays in markets.  In particular, attention may be given to ensuring that 
clearinghouses are clear as to the quality of oversight that is expected from 
them and how best it may be achieved.  For example, regulators may wish to 
have input into how large a clearinghouse can become in financial markets.  
Where clearinghouses are likely to grow large and clear a host of products, 
there may be a risk that they may be both too big to fail and far too big for 
any single country to save by itself.  Further, regulators may wish to have 
advance notice in case a member looks like it might fall into distress.  In 
such circumstances, clearinghouses may be reluctant to provide information 
on members or other traders, or fear that it reflects badly on their own 
operations.  With some kind of agreement in place between public regulators 
and clearinghouses, there may be more open information flow and greater 
sensitivity to the potential for even small risks spiral into systemic collapse.  
Without fuller attention on clearinghouses and a deeper understanding of 
their functions, we may fail to acknowledge the tremendous power—and the 
corresponding risks—of a key player in today’s financial markets. 
